Refugee resettlement is not new to EU member states. But the EU only accounts for The article outlines key elements of refugee resettlement and relocation that have recently emerged in the EU and discusses the prerequisites for the sustainable use of this tool in an unfavorable political and unclear legal environment, with particular focus on new member states. The main goal of the article is to identify factors that need to be considered for the design of sustainable resettlement and relocation programs, considering the aspects of political salience, legal conditions, burden-sharing, and member states' capacity. The case study of Lithuania presented in this article suggests that such programs need to be carefully considered and adequately funded as there are ample pitfalls which can quickly discredit the idea among the citizens.
INTRODUCTION
Refugee resettlement is a procedure whereby asylum seekers and refugees are transferred from the country of first asylum to a country where their safety and security could be provided on a permanent basis. 1 The transfer of refugees from one EU Member State (MS) to another is referred to as intra-EU relocation.
Relocation is a solidarity mechanism used to respond to emergencies. Relocation is a particular form of resettlement, which previously was used only in exceptional circumstances. However, over the coming years in the EU it may become a dominant form of solidarity in the burden-sharing of the influx of refugees. Even though the numbers of resettled refugees in the EU are rising, the EU contribution to the global resettlement statistics constituted only 8.3 percent in 2012 and 9 percent in 2013. 2 Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. Some EU countries have never been involved in any of these activities. 3 There are several resettlement models in the EU: (i) ad hoc resettlement and
(ii) program resettlement. The difference between the two is that the latter is based on a quota system, while the former is applied to respond to specific challenges and quotas do not apply. A mixed model which would include both mechanisms also exists. A recent surge of migration to the EU via the Mediterranean has spurred political action for a greater sharing of the burden of migration among the MS as for refugees to enter the EU. 1 However, as Nakashiba claims, there is no clear definition of resettlement and it has only loose support from the legal instruments (Haruno Nakashiba, "Clarifying UNHCR Resettlement. A few considerations from a legal perspective," Research paper No. 264 (November 2013): 1). 2 ERN (European Resettlement Network), "Introduction to resettlement in Europe" // http://www.resettlement.eu/page/introduction-resettlement-europe. 3 Ibid.
PRINCIPLE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF A EUROPEAN ASYLUM POLICY
When times in the EU are good, solidarity is something that may well be used as a synonym for 'synergy', 'economy of scale' and 'win-win outcomes'. However, once the need to address major policy challenges arises, solidarity may quickly be given connotations of 'injustice', 'bullying', and 'arm-twisting'. And in the latter situations all Europeanization needs to be very carefully considered, with resettlement (relocation) being no exception.
The key policy document that governs how the EU is supposed to tackle flows of asylum seekers among the Member States is the so-called Dublin III Regulation (No. 604/2013). However, in August 2015 Germany has publicly stated that: the "Dublin Procedures <…> are currently as far as possible factually not carried out <..>" 6 . This statement, explicitly retracted in November 2015, was widely portrayed by the media as the trigger for the start of a massive movement of people which is now labelled as the 'European migrant crisis'. Although in our estimation this event does not amount to a crisis and is better described as an ISSN 2029-0454 VOLUME 9, NUMBER 1 2016
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emergency, because the numbers and duration of elevated flow of refugees has not reached numbers that the EU as a whole would not have the capacity to deal with.
From the background of ever-growing refugee flows coming over the Mediterranean, Greece and Italy requested that a relocation instrument be applied within the EU in early 2014. In May 2015 relocation was included as a provision of the European Agenda on Migration in the section on immediate action 7 , and a decision was only reached in September 2015 8 , well after the German statement on not applying the Dublin III regulation. The plan to relocate 120,000 (later raised to 160,000) persons in the context of migration flows that were becoming multipletimes larger by the month seemed a far cry from the 2014 EC President's 5-point statement, the first of which called for the creation of a Common Asylum System. 9 The EC communication on this agenda stressed two important policy principles: solidarity and greater integration. The need for both is motivated by the unprecedented volume of people since the WWII, which no individual member state can tackle and the overflow with migrants does risk undercutting fundamental principles of the Union, such as the free movement of people.
The decision to introduce a relocation program, albeit limited in time and scope, is a very contentious issue both politically and academically. Some countries, most notably Hungary, refused to join the relocation program; Hungary is in the process of carrying out a referendum in October 2016 on whether to accept any future European Union quota system for resettling migrants without the consent of the parliament. 10 In academic writing the problems of European asylum policy have been known for decades. The EU's integration often runs into conflicts over jurisdiction between the EU and MS levels of governance. However, the EU is a union of 28 sovereign nations, and a state's ability to decide who is a citizen, and who can enter its territory, are at the core of the notion of sovereignty. 28 Lavenex differentiantes between intensive transgovernmentalism and community method, claiming that community method would be more comprehensive, but MS are unwilling to cede management and regulation of asylum processes. In large part this tension is a result of attempts to de-securitize asylum within the human rights discourse, and the post 9/11 national security concerns (see Sandra A lack of experience of large scale migration management and high securitization of the asylum process in the new MS does constitute a capacity gap.
However, it is also true that in view of mounting challenges few steps are being taken to build that capacity and utilize existing best practice elsewhere. In a sense low capacity becomes an excuse to avoid greater commitment. However, it's precisely greater commitment that can create that capacity. There are case studies suggesting that Dublin III encourages its violation by MS, because there are rational gains for a country at the expense of the Union. . 30 See Figure 1 for the differences between the two most effected western and new MS. there is a lack of capacity, or the countries that have a capacity gap must cover the expenses of MS incurred in using these capacities. However, despite that both of these alternatives have a right to be evaluated economically, the political conditions for how to apply them are hard to envisage. Although this must be said with some caution, as in political rhetoric the coupling of structural support and the solidary participation in the effort towards the resolution of the emergency are being voiced. In summary, Europeanization of asylum policy through appeals to solidarity is bound to be contentious, but upholding this principle, explicitly formulated in the Union Treaty, is a matter of existential importance to the Union. 34 Lillian M. Langford, supra note 32. 35 Also see decision was also questioned due to low capacities in Greece in Italy for identifying persons for relocation, and the slow pace with which other MS were scheduling relocation.
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As the relocation program for 2016 and 2017 was set in motion, the EC announced its intention to introduce a permanent 'quota system'. The proposals of the Commission for substantial amendments to the Dublin Regulation 58 place the main focus on the "state with which the asylum seeker holds a substantial link". If there is no such link, MS with the fewest accepted refugees would be obliged to admit the asylum seeker.
Clearly, a return to the old Dublin system is highly doubtful, as its failures are evident. The commission's proposal promises to reform the coercive nature of the Dublin system, which some authors have cited as the primary cause of its failure 59 ,
because it had few considerations for both MS and asylum seekers' interest. The proposal is based on the development of objectivized criteria, such as the link with a particular state through existence of family relations, job offerings, language skills, etc., and engages the applicant who would be required to prove this link. But it 'punishes' MS that are not active in the quota system -they will receive refugees with few or no social links in the country, making their integration more In the context of relocation, the European Council decision included a possibility of preferences, but these were focused on assessments of specific qualifications and characteristics of individual applicants, such as their language skills and other factors such as demonstrated family, cultural or social ties, which could facilitate their integration into the host society. 80 However, even such preferences may be abused. Some MS have expressed long or constraining lists of preferences for the profile of the applicants to be relocated. In effect they use priority setting as a means to exclude potential candidates, rather than to allow for better integration. 81 Another important issue is the decision on what status a relocated person will be granted: refugee or subsidiary protection. In the context of a resettlement country it is essential to ensure that resettled refugees enjoy the same legal status as recognized refugees. As the UNHCR stresses, the resettlement definition itself carries an obligation of the host state to admit resettled persons as refugees with permanent residence status (emphasis added). 82 The status should ensure durable security, possibility to obtain citizenship and should not restrict the implementation of certain rights. The EU law also requires that the person to be resettled to an MS territory is granted refugee or equivalent status with the same rights and privileges. 83 Security and durable solutions for refugees highly depend on the right to permanent residence, which allow applying for citizenship and family reunification rights. 84 Many states limit resettlement to refugees, thereby excluding non-refugee stateless persons, persons for whom resettlement is the most appropriate durable solution, and for certain non-refugee dependent members so as to retain family unity. 85 Sweden, for example, is one of the states that accepts persons who are refugees under the 1951 Convention and subsidiary protection ISSN 2029-0454 VOLUME 9, NUMBER 1 2016 111 criteria. No additional selection criteria apply. 86 In is important to stress that refugee status better reflects the essence and meaning of resettlement, because subsidiary protection usually is associated with temporary solutions, which do not guarantee permanent right of residence and offer less social guarantees.
ELEMENTS OF FUNCTIONAL AND SUSTAINABLE RESETTLEMENT SCHEMES
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Third, the issue of transferring persons who do not yet enjoy protection is a situation not typical to resettlement, and which could result in serious legal challenges. The EU relocation program was introduced as a reaction to a 'crisis' and foresaw a possibility to transfer persons without full determination of status, as asylum seekers only. This aspect is critical for two reasons: (i) it may place the asylum seeker in legal uncertainty, and (ii) it may discredit the scheme, if the public perceives it as being used to relocate persons who are not in need of protection. In Lithuania, legislative amendments were passed stating that the decision to grant protection shall be adopted within 24 hours from arrival of relocated person to Lithuania. 88 In the absence of proper determination of status before entry and with such short time constraints, arbitrary decisions may be the result. A similar practice is also applied in the Czech Republic, where resettled persons should formally apply for international protection within 2 days of arrival and receive refugee status within 3-4 weeks, meanwhile being treated as asylum seekers. 89 Adopting a decision on granting protection together with a decision on relocation (resettlement) would eliminate the legal uncertainty that may arise.
However, some states are also concerned that persons who are granted protection before arrival to the resettlement country may choose to travel to a different MS.
However, these concerns may be offset by withholding the issuance of residence permit or documents confirming protection status until arrival. . 87 In Lithuania the first relocated family was granted subsidiary protection, a decision which they appealed in court. The appeal was dismissed, but more importantly served to further build negative public perceptions of the entire scheme. 
THE RISKS AND PROMISES OF THE EUROPEAN RELOCATION SCHEME: THE CASE OF LITHUANIA
In 2015 Both the migration and asylum policy debates are highly salient in Lithuania.
Moreover, Lithuania experiences the highest levels of intra-EU emigration, which is widely perceived as an existential threat to the state. 96 Therefore immigration policy is highly restrictive. Lithuania does not have any strategic policy documents that plan and finance immigration. Lithuania has a migration policy guideline 97 in line with which three-year social integration programs for refugees are developed. 98 Therefore the administrative process is run to comply with a bare minimum of international standards 99 that may be defended in a court of law. On top of that, the Lithuanian asylum process is highly securitized 100 , and even the integration 103 Please note that results of the cited survey are in some contrast to findings in most other surveys. We believe the difference is caused by the fact that this questionnaire was formed in a way which did not ask approval for resettlement per se, but rather questions were framed in the context of inevitability of a resettlement decision and respondents were asked to present their preferences for the content of such a decision. The crucial finding from this survey, we believe, is that although a general negative attitude to resettlement does exist, it does not mean that there aren't possibilities to reverse it, or that this attitude offers support to political forces radically opposing resettlement. ISSN 2029-0454 VOLUME 9, NUMBER 1 2016
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creation of a continuation program with a system of fines and incentives to MS which most would undersign. Based on Table 2 we maintain that a relocation mechanism is the only one realistically available to the EU, but supplementary elements of other asylum policy instrument types also need to be enforced.
CONCLUSIONS
In the EU a tendency is emerging to create legal obligations with regard to intra-EU refugee transfers and an increasing formation of 'soft law' on resettlement from third states. For most of new EU MS (acceded post 2004) the implementation of the relocation program of 2016-2017, if it is followed through, will make relocation the dominating form of resettlement; in many instances it will be the primary cause of refugee arrival to these countries. This decision is not without its discontents, and that applies both to policy-makers in the new MS and to academia.
As relocation is a new legal concept in EU law and in some respects departs from certain principles and established practice of resettlement, it may raise additional concerns from the legal point of view. States should refrain from placing persons to be relocated in a situation of legal uncertainty whereby they are transferred to host countries without a decision on their status, as well as without their consent.
There are several key risks of Europeanizing asylum policy further. Everything hinges on solidarity, but there is no clear concept of what that actually constitutes.
A case in point are considerations by many that in the long run large scale immigration will be beneficial to the hosts relative to other MS that avoid taking on the burden in the short term, rendering the whole concept of solidarity inapplicable.
However, growing divergences in European policy are unwanted because the idea behind the Union is economic and social conversion.
We propose a typology conceptualizing possible policy innovations for the European asylum policy differentiated by who or what is being moved: persons, capacities or funds. We believe there is good reason to assume that the instrument of relocation, currently applied as a temporary and extraordinary measure in the face of alternatives, has the greatest chance of success and odds are it will become a routine practice. Yet from the point of view of new MS a measure of coercion is necessary to ensure that MS do not manipulate their way out of the problem through claims of lack of capacity or outright discreditation of the instrument in the eyes of their citizenry. However, this path must be tread very carefully so as not present the EU as a bully, and the introduction of policy elements-specifically, elements that would appropriately support MS in the development of capacities and, if necessary, sanction (or 'tax') MS for not participating-could do the trick. 
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